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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM J. FARRELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-_vs.THE MENNEN COMPANY, a corporation,
SMITH-FAUS DRUG COMPANY, a corporation, ZIONS CO-OPERATIVE MERCANTILE INSTITUTION, a corporation,
WALGREEN DRUG COMPANY, a corporation, and JOHN DOE,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
7461

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action to enjoin and permanently restrain
the above named defendants from selling any hair tonic or
skin lotion or other toilet article in the State of Utah
under any trade name using the word uBracer" or otherwise infringing upon appellant's trade name. ~B~ace For
The Hair, A Real- Bracer For The Hair." On October 1,
1
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1949 the appellant :filed in the office of the Clerk of the
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah a duly verified complaint
(R. 1-6) against the above named defendants reading as
follows:

uThe above named plaintiff complains of the
above named defendants and for a cause of action
alleges:
ul. That defendant The Mennen Company is
now, and was at all times herein mentioned, a corporation, duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of New Jersey; and
that said defendant is now engaged in the manufacture of a certain skin lotion known as uskin
Bracer" and the distribution of the same in .the
State of Utah; and that said defendant is now doing business in the State of Utah.
c:t2. That defendants Smith-Faus Drug Company and Zions Co-operative Mercantile Institution are now, and were at all times herein mentioned, corporations, duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah
with their principal place of business located in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah; and that both of said
defendants are now engaged in operating wholesale
drug companies in Salt Lake City, Utah, and that
as such both of said defendants sell and distribute
in the State of Utah the afore-mentioned skin lotion under the trade name of uSkin Bracer."
u3. That defendant Walgreen Drug Company
is no'Y", and was at all times herein mentioned, a corporation, duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of Utah; and that
said defendant was and is engaged in operating re-
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tail drug stores throughout the State of Utah, and
that in the course of this said retail drug business
said defendant has sold and is selling the afore-mentioned skin lotion under the trade name of uSkin
Bracer."
((4. That defendant John Doe is the fictitious

name of a defendant unknown who is now engaged
in the wholesale drug business in the State of Utah
and is selling said skin lotion under the trade name
of ((Skin Bracer" in the State of Utah, and that
when his true name is discovered, plaintiff asks tha~
this complaint may be amended by inserting such
true name in the place and stead of such fictitious
name.

us.

That plaintiff is now, and has been at all
times herein mentioned, an actual and bona-fide
resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, engaged in the extensive and profitable business of
manufacturing and selling, wholesale and retail, a
certain hair tonic and skin lotion in the State of
Utah which is an original formula conceived by
plaintiff; that in said business the plaintiff purchases the many and varied ingredients used in the
manufacture of the said hair tonic and skin lotion
and mixes them according to his said formula, and
bottles and labels the product and sells the same
to barbershops and customers throughout the State
of Utah and uses the same in connection with a certain barbershop owned and operated by plaintiff
in Salt Lake City, Utah, wherein said product is
manufactured, under the trade name of uBrace
For the Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair"; that by
reason of the competent and efficient manner in
which plaintiff has always conducted and does conduct his said business, the said hair tonic and skin
lotion has acquired and now commands an exten3
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sive patronage in the State of Utah under the said
trade name of ((Brace For The Hair, A Real Bracer
For the Hair/' an.d plaintiff has acquired and now
has a goodwill in said business under said trade name
of great value.
u6. That in accordance with the laws and

statutes of the State of Utah, the·n and now in effect, plaintiff did on, or about, the 31st day of
August, 19 2 5, file of record in the office of the
Secretary of State of the State of Utah his registra·
tion of the said trade name, uBrace For The Hair,
A Real Bracer For The Hair," and said registration
is now, and has been at all times since said date of
filing, of full legal force and effect; and that a copy
of said registration, certified by the office of the
Secretary of State of the State of Utah, is attached
hereto, marked uExhibit A," and by reference
made a part of this complaint.
u7. That for sometime last past the defendant
The Mennen Company has been manufacturing the
aforesaid skin lotion under the said trade name of
uSkin Bracer" and that all of the defendants, including The Mennen Company, have been selling
and distributing the said skin lotion in the State of
Utah under the trade name of uSkin Bracer." That
by using a trade name so similar to that trade name
long used 'by plaintiff for his skin lotion and hair
tonic defendants have appropriated to their own
use and benefit the goodwill of plaintiff's business
and deluded the plaintiff's customers and the public
in general into the belief that the product manufactured and sold by plaintiff and the product sold
by defendants are one and the same article· and
.
'
that 1f defendants continue to sell a skin lotion in
the State of Utah with the word uBracer" in the
trade name, the customers and prospective custom-
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,.,

ers of the plaintiff and the public in general will at
all times be deceived, misled and defrauded into believing the article sold by defendants is the same
article as that which is manufactured and sold by
plaintiff.
tt8. That plaintiff has repeatedly made demand

upon the defendant The ~1ennen Company to
cease and desist from encroaching and infringing
upon the duly registered trade name of the plaintiff in the State of Utah, and said defendant has refused and failed to heed said warnings. That unless restrained the defendants will continue and
proceed to carry on their business of selling a skin
lotion under the said trade name which encroaches
upon the registered trade name of the plaintiff as
afore-mentioned; that said acts of defendants have
created and will continue to create much confusion
in plaintiff,s said business; and that plaintiff has no
adequate remedy at law.

((WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays, judgment that
defendants, and each of them, be enJoined and re-..
strained permanently from selling any hair tonic
or skin lotion or other toilet article in the State of
Utah under any trade name using the word uBracer" or otherwise infringing upon plaintiff,s aforesaid trade name, and that plaintiff have such other
and further relief as to the Court may seem proper,
and that plaintiff have his costs incurred herein.

/sl JOHN HAYS O,DONNELL
lsi RAYMOND R. BRADY
Attorneys for Plaintiff."
A copy of the filed appellant's application for the
mentioned trade name with a certificate from the Secretary
of State's Office, for Utah, showing that the application

v

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was a true, full and ~correct copy, was marked as uExhibit
A" and attached to the complaint (R. 5-6) and to each
of the three copies of the complaint served upon each of
the three respondents.
Only the respondents, Smith-Faus Drug Company,
Zions Co-operative Mercantile Institution and Walgreen
Drug Company, were ever served properly and legally
with a copy of the summons and the above-mentioned
complaint. The Mennen Company and John Doe were
not served properly with summons herein and have made
no general appearance before the said District Court or any
other court. Consequently, we mean only Smith-Faus
Drug Company, Zions Co-operative Mercantile Institution and Walgreen Drug Company when we refer to the
urespondents.,
On October 22nd, 1949, a demurrer (R. 7) was served
upon appellant, through his counsel, and filed in Court,
reading as follows:
ucome now the defendants, Smith-Faus Drug
Company, Zion's Co-operative Mercantile Institution, and Walgreen Drug Company, and demur to
plaintiff's complaint herein, upon the ground that
said complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action."
The said demurrer came on regularly for hearing,
upon appellant's motion, before the Court, Honorable
Roald A. Hogenson presiding as Judge, upon November
8th, 1949. C. E. Henderson appeare·d and represented th~ three respondents at the hearing of the general
demurrer. Mr. Henderson submitted three arguments
6
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~

~
~

in support of his contention that the demur should be
sustained, and these arguments were as follows:
Mr. Henderson's self-styled main point was to
cite the old general rule that a word or combination of
words which are merely descriptive of the subject to
which it is applied is not usually a good trade name. Then
Mr. Henderson quoted from dictionaries showing that in
the eighteenth century the word ubracer" meant a tonic.
1.

Mr. Henderson then argued that even though
appellant's trade name was valid, appellant's registration
of the same is only in connection with its use as a hair
tonic and could not effect the respondents who are only
in the skin lotion business.
2.

Mr. Henderson then argued that because appellant's complaint had the afore-mentioned certificate
marked uExhibi.t A" (R. 5-6) attached -to it and because of
the allegations in paragraph six of the complaint (R. 2-3),
the Court should not consider the doctrine of secondary
meanings, and should only ove·rrule the demur if the appellant's trade name is valid by reason of the same having
been registered in accordance with law.
3.

The Court ordered the parties to submit written
memoranda of authorities in support of their respective
positions on the aforesaid three arguments, and, thereafter,
the memoranda were submitted by the respective parties
in accordance with the wishes of the Court. Thereafter,
on December 20, 1949, the District Court entered its
Order sustaining the respondents' demurrer. Naturally,
neither party knows which of the three arguments of re7
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spondents, if any, influenced the Court when it sustained
the demurrer.
The appellant has alleged all facts in his complaint
that he can· prove if granted a hearing or trial on questions
of fact; conseque·ntly, the appellant cannot amend his complaint, and, thus, he elected in writing (R. 8) to stand on
the said complaint. On January 9, 1950 the District
Court · entered its judgment (R. 9) herein reading as
follows·:
· ;,.,
· uin this action, the defendants, Smith-Faus
Drug Company, Zions Co-operative Mercantile
Institution and Walgreen Drug Company, having
appear~d and demurred to the plaintiff's complaint
herein, and the issues of law thereto arising having
been fully argued and duly submitted to the court,
and the court being fully advised in the premises,
:_having entered its order herein on the 20th day of
· December, 1949, sustaining said demurrer, and the
plaintiff having ·elected to stand on his said compl~int,

uNow, on motion of C. E. Henderson, one of the
, _ ··atto~neys for said demurring defendants,

UIT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the complaint herein be, and the
··same is hereby dismissed.
uEntered this 9th day of January, 1950.
Is/ ROALD A. HOGENSON
District Judge."

The appellant has prosecuted this appeal from that
. judgment and order.

·
8
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STATEMENT OF THE TWO POINTS UPON
WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO REPLY FOR A
REVERSAL OF THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT
COURT SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS' DEMURRER AND OF THE JUDGMENT HEREIN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S
COMPLAINT .
.
THE DISTRICT COURT IS IN ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND
APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE
OF ACTION; AND, THUS, THE DISTRICT COURT
IS IN ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE GENERAL
DEMURRER OF THE DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS, SMITH- FAUS DRUG COMPANY,
ZIONS CO-OPERATIVE MERCANTILE INSTITUTION AND WALGREEN DRUG COMPANY.
1.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS IN ERROR
WHEN IT RENDERED AND ENTERED ITS ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE HEREIN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT.
2.

ERROR NUMBER ONE
. THE DISTRICT COURT IS IN ERROR WHEN
IT RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT DOES NOT STATE FACTS
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION; AND, THUS, THE DISTRICT COURT IS IN
ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE GENERAL DEMURRER O·F THE DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS, SMITH-FAUS DRUG COMPANY, ZIONS
9
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CO-OPERATIVE MERCANTILE INSTITUTION
AND WALGREEN DRUG COMPANY.
ARGUMENT ON ERROR NUMBER ONE
It is the contention of the appellant that the District
Court, when it rendered its decision on the hearing of the
said demurrer, misapplied the general rule, which we
agree is followed in most jurisdictions, that a word or
combination of words which is merely a generic term or
descriptive of an article, or trade, or its composition,
characteristics, or qualities cannot ordinarily be appropriated as a trademark or trade name to the exclusion of its
use by others, for the one and only reason that to permit
such exclusion would deny competitors the right to describe their goods and wares to the public. As with most
general rules, this rule has many exceptions and the word
in controversy, uBracer," comes within some of these exceptions. The District Court entered its Order sustaining
respondents' demurrer, just eleven days before the ~ew
rules of civil procedure for Utah Courts became effective.
These new rules permit no demurrers.
The respondents quoted to the District Court from a
few dictionaries, which, in an attempt to impress ~heir
readers with the exhaustive scope of the work, had included among their definitions of the word ubracer," an
old ·eighteenth century definition, to-wit: A utori.ic."
However, all such dictionaries are careful to designate the
simile for the word, ubracer," as obsolete, and very few
smaller dictionaries even bother to mention this antiquated
and long-forgotten meaning. We, herewith, cite for the
Court's information from the dictionaries that we found
10
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ustng the aforesaid antiquated definition of the word,
((Bracer."
Webster's New International Dictionary Of The
English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged, for 1949,
defines on page 322 as follows:
uBracer. ( 1 ) That which braces, binds or
makes firm; a brace. (2) One who braces, as in attaching uppers to soles or in boiler-works. (3a)
Obsolete. A tonic or stimulant. {3b) Slang. A
drink of liquor."

The same dictionary on page 2665 de·fines as !ollows:
uTonic. Pertaining to or characterized by
tension, esp. muscular tension; hence, producing
or adapted to produce healthy muscular condition
and reaction."
The same Dictionary on page 1461 defines as follows:
((Lotion. Act Qf washing, ablution. Obsolete. A liquid medicinal preparation for washing;
a wash."
Volume 1 of the Oxford's New English Dictionary
On Historical Principals, page 1043, published incidently
in 18 88, even classifies the utonic" simile for the word
bracer as obsolete at that time when it defines bracer as
follows:
u3. That which braces (the nerves) ; hence, a
tonic medicine. (a common sense in the 18th century, now obsolete)."
I~

Funk & Wagnall's New Standard Dictionary of the
English Language defines on page 322 as follows:

11
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uBracer ( 1) That which braces, . binds,
strengthens, steadies; a band. ( 2) Som_eth1ng to
brace the nerves · a tonic ; a common use 1n theory,
18th century, n~w slang for a morning drink.
Now that we have shown that utonic'' is only an
obsolete meaning for the word, ubracer," we cite from the
Restatement of the Law and certain cases and authorities
applying the rule that in .instances where a word or combination of words has only an obsolete generic· or descriptive meaning, as it pertains to the disputed product, the
afore-mentioned ge·neral rule does not apply, for the reason
that the word is not in fact generic or descriptive. Restatement Of The Law, Torts, Division 3, page 580, sec.
72l{c):
u (c) . A designation is not generic or descriptive under the rule stated in this section,* if its
generic or descriptive meaning is obsolete or is
known only to philogists, lexicographers or persons acquainted with curiosities of antiquity. Since
the meaning is not known in the market, one's
use of the designation as a trade-mark does not
interfere with the efforts of other merchants to describe their goods. The test is the meaning attached
to the· designation by prospective purchases, rather
than the scientific meaning."
'
*The rule mentioned in the above quotation
is sec~ion 721 on page 579 of the same book reading as follows: u.A designation cannot be a trademark for goods if it is likely to be regarded by prospective purchasers as a common name or generic
name for such goods or as descriptive of them or
their ingredients, quality, properties functions or
,
uses. "

12
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,,,.

Using the test mentioned by the Restatement in section 721 (c) we are convinced that a customer in a department store would be referred to the· State Liquor Store and
not the shaving-needs, hair tonics and cosmetic counter
when this customer told the floor walker that he needed a
ubracer." We believe further that no one would recognize a product described only as a c:cbracer" as being a hair
tonic or skin lotion; therefore, we argue that the appellant's competitors are not injured when the State refuses
to permit them to use the word ubracer" in connection
with their respective products. In short, the ordinary
man does not today confuse tonics and bracers as being
the same article.
We cite the following case and authorities which also
apply the aforesaid exception to the said general rule:

(.(.A word which has become obsolete, or which
is not in general or common use, and is unintelligible
and nondescriptive to the general public, though
it may be known to linguists and scientists, may be
regarded as arbitrary and fanciful, and capable of
being used as a trademark or trade-name." LeBlume Import Co., Inc., vs. Coty, 293 F. 344.
uAn obsolete word, or one unintelligible to the
general public may be a trade-mark even though its
technical meaning might otherwise forbid its
use." 63 C.J. 345.
Respondents cited to the District Court, in reply to
our argument, Vol. 1 of Nims' ccUnfair Competition &
Tradenames," page 558 wherein Mr. Nims disagrees with
the LeBlume Import Co. vs. Coty (supra.) case and claims
the case is not generally followed. However, the Restatement, Corpus Juris and American Jurisprude·nce, among
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others, seem to disagree with Mr. Nims and the respondents. We maintain that the Restatement and the other
authorities are right, because no one is denied or hampered
in his right to describe his product to the public, by applying the LeBlume Import Co. vs. Coty case cule.
In order to prove that the word ubracer" is a proper
subject for use as a trade name, we cite now various cases
and authorities offering tests and guides as to what words
can be restricted-we feel certain that the Court must
apply each test favorable to the following question presented by this ,case: Is the word ubracer" as used in appellant's trade name, uBracer For The Hair, A Real Bracer
For The Hair," capable of being ~ppropriated as a trade
name for a combination hair tonic and skin lotion to the
restriction of the use of the word by all appellant's competitors and potential competitors in connection with their
competing or potentially competing products?
u.A word or combination of words which is
merely descriptive of an article of trade, or its composition, ·characteristic, or qualities, cannot be appropriated as a trademark to the exclusion of its
use by others. This rule excluding descriptive
terms has also been held to apply to tradenames.
As to whether words employed fall within this
prohibition, it is said that the true test is not
whether they are exhaustively descriptive of the
article designated, but whether in themselves, and
as they are commonly used by those who understand their meaning, they are reasonably indicative
and descriptive of the thing intended." Vol. 52,
Am. Jur., page 543.
u.It has been held that words which are mere-
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tive of the composition, quality or characteristics
of the article, may be appropriate as a valid trademark." Vol. 52, American Jurisprudence, page
544.
Certainly the word ttbracer" is only remotely descriptive of such products as skin lotions and hair tonics,
in fact, under all modern meanings of the word, it is not
descriptive at all of such products.
uNames or marks which merely to some extent suggest the character, quality or ingredients
of an article, or some supposed advantage to be
derived from using it, or some effect to be produced by its use, or the locality of its origin, have
been ordinarily upheld as valid trade-marks. The
validity of a trade-mark ends where suggestion
ends and description begins." 63 Corpus Juris,
page 353.
uwhile it is the general rule that a word which
is merely descriptive of the article on which it is
used, or of its ingredients or characteristics, cannot
be a valid trademark. The rule does not necessarily
exclude words which are suggestive of ingredients
or quality." LeBlume Import Co., Inc. vs. Coty,
(Supra).
ccGenerally, the courts will not enjoin the use
of a name consisting solely of generic· terms, but it
may do so where its use would be confusing and
misleading." Brown vs. Hook, (Calif.), 180 Pac.
(2nd) 982; 79 Calif. App. (2nd) 781.
The Restatement of the Law, Torts, Division 3, section 717, page 562 analyzes the elements necessary to constitute a prima facie case of infringement of a trade name
as follows:
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uOne infringes another's trade. na~e, if_ (a)
without a privilege to do so, he uses tn hts busmess,
in the manner of a trade·-mark or trade name, a
designation which is identical with or confusingly
similar to the other's trade name, though he does
not use the designation for ~he purpose of deception, and (h) the other's interest in his trade name
is protected with reference to (i) the goods, services or business· in connection with which the actor
uses his designation, and (ii) the markets in which
the actor uses his designation.
Paragraphs seven and eight of the complaint set forth
heretofore and on file (R.3-4) herein allege that the name
of the product being distributed by the respondents and
the trade name of the appellant's product are confusing
the buying public and will continue to mislead appellant's
customers, and for the purposes of the demurrer the District Court must assume these allegations to be absolutely
true. Therefore, applying the above rule of Brown vs.
Hook (supra) the District Court should grant the injunction prayed for in the appellant's complaint, upon appellant's proving the facts alleged therein to the effect that
the public is, and will be, misled.
uAccording to some authorities, there is a
distinction between the use of a name which mere..
ly describes the business a~d its generic in its nature, and a name which, although descriptive of a
business, neve·rtheless depends upon a :figure of
speech and association of ideas, and is not merely a
literal description of a business. In the latter case,
where the name is novel, unusual, or fanciful, it
may ?e ~ppropriated ~y a trader, even though it is
descrtpttve of the hustness he carries on." Vol. 52,
Am. Jur., page 545.
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ttWhether a name claimed as a trademark is
subject to the objection of being descriptive, or
whether it is an arbitrary or fancy name,, must depend on the circumstances of each case as it arises.,
52 Am. Jur., pages 546-547.
Applying the above universally followed rule, the District Court by sustaining the respondents' general demurrer, denied the appellant any opportunity to show any of
the circumstances of this particular matter, since the complaint quite properly only alleged ultimate facts.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the word
ubracer" is descriptive of the hair tonic or skin lotion busi...
ness, which we most strenuously deny, the Court must next
determine whether the appellant has obtained the right to
enjoin competitors and potential competitors . from confusing the public by the use of the word under the doctrine of usecondary meaning." By sustaining the demurrer, the Court refused appellant an opportunity to prove
that the appellant's mentioned trade name had obtained
sufficient significance in the public mind to come within
the application of the aforesaid doctrine. As we have
said, the Court on the hearing of a demurrer must deem
each and every allegation of the complaint to be true for
the purposes of ruling upon the demurrer. Therefore,
there can be no argument, it is absolutely true and cannot be questioned, at this time, that the allegations from
paragraphs five, seven and eight (R. 2-4) of the complaint
are true. The allegations in these three pa-ragraphs in
words and effect show that from August 31, 1925 until
now the appellant has been engaged in an extensive and
profitable hair tonic and skin lotion manufacturing and
selling business in Utah, that said hair tonic and skin lotion
17
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is manufactured under the trade name of uBrace For The
Hair, A Real Bracer For the Hair," that by reason of the
manner in which appellant has conducted his business it
has acquired and now commands an extensive patronage
and has goodwill in the state under the said trade name, that
the trade name of the product, ((Skin Bracer," sold and
distributed in Utah by respondents is so similar to the said
trade name long used by appellant for his product that
they have appropriated to their own use and benefit the
said goodwill of appellant's business and have deluded the
appellant's customers and the public in general into the
belief that the two products of the respective parties are
one and the same product, that to continue to allow respondents to sell a skin lotion in Utah with the word
ubracer" in the trade name will deceive, mislead and defraud the appellant's customers and prospective customers
into believing the article sold by respondents is the same
article as that which is manufactured and sold by plaintiff,
that unless restrained respondents will continue and proceed to carry on the business of selling a skin lotion under
a trade name which has and will create much confusion
in appellant's business, and that appellant has no adequate
remedy at law. Each and every one of the foregoing facts
must be deemed to be true by the Court, and the District
Court has held that it cannot grant appellant equitable
relief in spite of the unquestioned truth of the same. No
other allegation is necessary to apply the doctrine of usecondary meaning." To show that other courts and authorities have· disagreed with the District Court and granted relief, under the doctrine of ((secondary meaning," we cite
the following authorities and case:
ult i~ settled law that words to which no right
of exclusive use may be acquired, such as generic
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terms, descriptive words, and geographical of proper names, may be·come so associated in the public
mind with the goods or business of some one person
as to acquire a secondary meaning; in which case
no other person may use them without clearly indicating that his goods or business are not the same
as those to which such terms have become associated." 40 A.L.R. 43 3.
uThe term ttradename' is used in various
senses.. Thus, it has sometimes been used· to indicate
a mark affixed to goods where such mark is not
originally susceptible of exclusive appropriation,
but has acquired a secondary meaning." 52 Am.
Jur. page 509.
ttA protectible right in the use for trade purposes of a word in common use may be acquired
under the doctrine of secondary meaning." 52
Am. Jur., page 509.

~

.

,•

uEven though a word or combination of words
is incapable of becoming a valid trademark, yet, if
it has by a sufficiently long and exclusive use
acquired such a secondary meaning as to indicate
in the trade that the goods to which it is applied are
made by a particular manufacturer, or are put on
the market by a particular vendor, its use by another or similar goods in such a way as to be likely
to deceive purchasers will be· restrained as unfair
competition; and its use, even in its primary meaning, will be so limited as to prevent the working of
a probable deception by passing off the goods of one
maker as those of another. And some cases even
have referred to a name which has acquired such a
meaning as in the ·case of a geographical name, as a
valid trademark." 26 R. C. L., Trademarks, Sec.
61, page 886.
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uThe trademark ccoca-Cola' has become so
identified with the product of a particula_r comp~ny
as to have acq·uired a secondary meaning, whtch
will be protected in the courts despite ~ny weakness there may be in the name as a technical trademark. Whether the name (Cleo-Cola' is, as used
by defendant so similar to the trademark (CocaCola' that the former will probably deceive purchasers and cause them to buy the former product
in the belief that it is the latter is a question of
fa·ct." Cleo Syrup Corp. vs. Coca-Cola Co. 139
Fed. (2nd) 416; 150 A.L.R. 1056.
We submit that even though the word ccbracer" were
a descriptive of generic word as it pertains to appellant's
business, which it is not under modern usage, the appellant's complaint alleges facts showing such an old, wellestablished, publicly known, constant, extensive and
profitable business under his trade name that he has alleged every element necessary to show a right to relief
under the doctrine of usecondary meaning."
The following are some examples of words which
are adjectives which the courts have upheld as valid trade
names:.
((Landlords' Protective Bureau" infringed by
uLandlords' Protective Department," Koebel vs.
Chicago Landlords' Protective Bureau, 210 Ill. 176;
71 N.E. 362; 112 Ill. App. 21.

uLittle Shop" infringed by ccLittle Antique Shop,"
C. C. White Co. vs. Miller, 50 Fed. 277.
ccMoxie Nerve Food" infringed by uStandard Nerve
Food," Moxie Nerve Food Co. vs. Baumbach, 32
Fed. 205.
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uNational Folding Box & Paper Co." infringed by
uNational Folding Box Co." National Folding
Box & Paper Co. vs. National Folding Box Co., 43
W.R. 156.
uold Crow" infringed by uWhite Crow," W. A.
Gaines & Co. vs. Leslie, 54 N.Y. Supp. 421.
uRubberset" infringed by uRubberbound," Rubber & Celluloid, H. T. Co. vs. Rubberbound Brush
Co., 81 N. J. Eq. 419 ; 8 8 Atl. 21 0.
ccDr. Williams' Pink Pills For Pale People,", infringed by uDr. Wilson's Pink Pills For Anaemic
People~" Dr. Williams' Medical Company vs. Tothill, Cape Good Hope, 20. S.C. 483; 21 S.· C. 589.
((Holeproof" infringed by uNo-Hole," Holeproof
Hosiery Co. vs. Fitts, 167 Fed. 378.
uKeepclean" infringed by uSta-Kleen," Florence
Mfg. Co. vs. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed.· 73, 101
C.C.A. 7.
.
·, ·;

..r

uPep-0-Mint" infringed by uPeptomint," L. P~
·Larson, Jr. Co. vs. Lamont, Corliss & Co., 257 Fed.
270; C.C.A. 7.

. . uRubberset" infringed by uSet In Rubber," Rubber
& Celluloid, H. T. Co. vs. F. W. De Voe & C. T.
Reynolds Co., 233 Fed. 150 .
· uSix Little Taylors" infringed by uSix Big Taylors/'
Mossier vs. Jacobs, 6 5 Ill. App. 571.

..

....

uwearever" infringed by ((Everlasting," Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. vs. National Aluminum
Works, 226Fed.815 .
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uElastic Seam" infringed by uStretchiseam,"
A. Scriven Co. vs. Girard Co., 140 Fed. 794.

J.

uHome" infringed by uHome Delight," New
Home Sewing Machine Co. vs. Bloomingdale, 59
Fed. 284.
((Manufacturers' Outlet Co.'' infringed by uTaunton Outlet Co.," Samuels vs. Spitzer, 177 Mass.
226; 58 N.E. 693.

uMechanics' Store" infringed by uMechanical
Store," Weinstock, Lubin & Co. vs. Marks, 42 Pac.
142; 109 Calif. 529; 30 L. R. A. 182.
There can be no argument, admittedly, that the
manufacturer of steel braces for bridges could not prevent
his competitors from using the word ((brace" or ubracer"
to describe their business or products because the word is
descriptive of their product and the competitors would be
denied the important right of describing their respective
products to ·customers and the public if the word were
thus restricted. Nor do we maintain, that the law would
restrict persons manufacturing or selling hairdressing from
the· use of the word utonic" to describe their product, because a competitor registered the word. However, we do
maintain that the appellant's competitors have lost no right
to describe their products, though it be a hair tonic, skin
lotion or cosmetic, merely because the appellant has restricted them from using the word ~(bracer," since the
word ubracer," as it pertains to the appellant's business
and the respondents' businesses and their competitors' businesses is not descriptive of such businesses-the word is
fanciful and arbitrary under modern meanings when used
in the manner the appellant has registered it.

22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The respondents, at the hearing of their demurrer,
also half-heartedly argued that the appellant and respondents are not in fact competitors, and for that reason the
appellant is not entitled to the relief demanded by him in
the prayer of his said complaint. The complaint in paragraph seven (R. 3) , and elsewhere in the said pleading, has
alleged that all parties herein are in the competitive business of selling and distributing skin lotions, and respondents must deny this allegation, if they could, by answer
and not by demurrer. The Court must assume the allegations to be true, while determining the demurrer, that the
parties both sell products designed for the same use in the
same territory-not that the parties need, however, to be
in immediate competition before the courts can restrain
one from the use of the others valid trade name. The
Restatement of the Law, Torts, Division 3, page 599, section 730 (b) gives the best digest of the law on the subject of who can be restrained from use of a trade name as
follows:
uWhile the class of goods, services or business
with reference to which the interest in a trade mark
or trade name is protected has been greatly expanded, the class is nevertheless limited. The interest
is not protected against the use of a similar designation for any goods, service or business. It is
protected only within the limits fixed by the likelihood of confusion of prospective purchasers. The
issue of each case is whether goods, services or businesses of the actor and of the other are sufficiently
related so that the alleged infringement would subject the good-will and reputation of the other's
trademark or trade name to the hazards of the
actor's business. If pancake syrup is marketed
under a designation confusingly similar to a trademark for pancake flour, it is clear that the market
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reputation of the flour is subject to the hazards of
the market reputation of the syrup since both products are bought by substantially the same purchasers for use together. But, if lipsticks are
marketed under a designation confusingly similar
to a trade-mark for steam shovels, it is not likely
that the market reputation of the steam shovels
would thereby share in the market vicissitudes of
the lipsticks. The test here, as on the issue of confusing similarity, is the probable reaction of prospective purchasers."
Applying th~ test set forth in ·the above quote, and
even assuming that appellant manufactured only a hair
tonic and respondents sold only an after-shave lotion,
would not both of these products be sold at the men's cosmetic counter, would the public be surprised if one manufacturer made two such products, would not many of the
same customers use both products, and are not both products apt to be retailed from many of the same outlets?
James Love Hopkins in his treatise entitled, uThe Law Of
Trademarks, Tradenames & Unfair Competition, Fourth
Edition," seems to agree with the Restatement's rule and
says on page 37 6 as follows:
«'In determining whether unfair competition
exists, it is necessary to determine whether the
parties are competitors in business. In considering
the defense that the parties were not engaged in
competition in business, where plaintiff was a miller
and flour dealer and the defendant a baker, Jud.,ge
Anderson (in Potter-W rightington, Inc. vs. Ward
Baking Co., 288 Fed. 597-601) disposed of the defense accurately and tersely as follows: «But both
are seeking to enlarge their markets by attracting
the ultimate consumer of wheat, mainly eaters of
bread.'"
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In the case before the Court, if the matter had been
allowed to go to trial, the trial court would have the duty
to determine whether, as a question of fact, the trade name,
uBrace For The Hair, A Real Bracer For The Hair" and
the trade name, ((Skin Bracer" are sufficiently similar to
cause possible confusion in the mind of a potential pur~
chaser of the former product. Actual confusion is not
necessary as shown in the following quote:
uln order to establish trade-mark infringement
or unfair competition, it was not necessary that
plaintiff should prove actual confusion of goods."
California Prune & Apricot Growers Ass'n. vs.
H. R. Nicholson Co., 15 8 Pac. (2nd) 7 64; 69 Calif.
App. (2nd) 207.

uTo entitle a party to injunctive relief against
the deceptive and injurious use of its tradename
which has allegedly acquired a secondary meaning,
it is not necessary that the parties be in competitive
business or that the injury has already occurred, but
it is sufficient if the names, although not identical,
are sufficiently similar to cause confusion and
injury." Academy of Motion Picture Arts &
Sciences vs. Benson, 104 Pac. (2nd) 6 50; 15 Cal.
(2nd) 685.
However, the appellant in paragraphs seven and eight
(R. 3-4) of his complaint has alleged that there has been
and will be confusion upon the part of appellant's customers and upon the part of the public itself. Only after
hearing the appellant's evidence can a court determine
fairly whether the names are so similar as to there being a
possibility of confusion. In support of this contention we
cite the following cases and authorities:
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ult is a mere matter of judgment whether or
not the word-symbol and the representation would
convey to the mind of the ordinary purchaser the
same thing." Digest of Decision of La~ & Practice in the Patent Office and The Un1ted States
and State Courts in Patents, Trade-Marks, Copyrights & Labels by W. L. Pollard, page 524.
((What similarity is sufficient for a party to
benefit himself by the good name of another must
be determined in each case by its own circumstances, and generally a similarity which would be
likely to deceive or mislead an ordinary unsuspecting customer is obnoxious to the law." Academy
of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences vs. Benson
(supra).
((To entitle the owner of a trade-mark or
trade-name to an injunction, it is not essential that
the mark or name used be the same, if it be so similar that purchasers would be liable to be misled."
LeBlume Import Co., Inc. vs. Coty et al., 293 Fed.
344; 292 Fed. 264.
The appellant's complaint has certainly alleged facts
sufficient to show that he conformed with all acts necessary in the year 19 2 5 in order to register his trade name,
by the alle·gations in paragraph five (R. 2) and the certified copy of the application for registration (R. S-6) designated as uExhibit A" and attached to and by reference
(R. 3) made a part of said complaint. The statute controlling the registration of trademarks in the year 1925 is
cited in the Compiled Laws of Utah for 1907 as section
2721, page 927 and in the Compiled Laws of Utah for
1917 as section 6146, page 119 8, and reads as follows:
26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

!

uAny person, association or union may record
his or its claim to the same, and a copy or description
of such trademark or name, with his affidavit
attached thereto, certified by any officer authorized
to take acknowledgments of conveyance, setting
forth that he, or the firm, corporation, association,
or union of which he is a member, is the exclusive
owner, or agent of the owner, of such trade mark
or name.''
The above statute remained in effect until March 6, 1931,
when the Nineteenth Regular Session of the Utah State
Legislature passed House Bill number 57 (Chapter 16 on
page 17 of the Session Laws of Utah for 1931). The present statute in effect, Title 95, Chapter 2, Section 95-2-1,
of the Utah Code Annotated for ·1943 is almost ide·ntical to
the above section (in fact, the editor of the said Code erroneously states in the annotations that the sections are
identical) in words and effect, but the present statute requires publication of the intended registered trade name.
The respondents need not have had actual knowledge
of the fact that appellant had appropriated the trade name
that, as aforesaid, he now does business under. In support
of this statement we cite from the following case:
((Actual knowledge of plaintiff's prior appropriation of the trade name and design is immaterial
in an action to restrain infringement; registration
being ·constructive notice.'' Hall vs. Holstrom. 287
Pac. 668 ~ 106 Cal. App. 563.
The Restatement of the Law, Torts, Division 3, section 731 sets forth certain tests which the Court should
apply to appellant's complaint to determine whether appellant has alleged sufficient facts to allege a course of action. Section 731, page 600, reads as follows:
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uln determining whether one's interest in a
trade-mark or tradename· is protected, under the
rules stated in section 717 (supra) and section
73o~· with reference to the goods, services or business in connection with which the actor uses his
designation, the following facts are important:
(a) the likelihood that the actor's goods,
services or business will be mistake·n for those of the
other;
u

(b) the likelihood that the other may expand
his business so as to compete with the actor;
(C:

(c) the extent to which the goods or services
of the actor and those of the other have common
purchasers or use·rs;
u.

(d) the entent to which the goods or services
of the actor and those of the other are marketed
through the same channels;
u

(e) the relation between the functions of the
goods or services of the actor and those of the other;
u

(f) the degree of distinctiveness of the
trade-mark or trade name;
u

(g) the degree of attention usually given
to the trade symbols in the purchase of goods or
services of the actor and those of the other;
u

*Section 730 (page 596). uThe interest in a trademark or tradename is protected under the rule
stated in '§717 with reference only to (a) competing goods, services in business and .(b) other goods,
services or business which in view of .the designation
are use·d. by the actor, likely to be regarded by
prospective purchasers as associated with the source
identified by the trade mark or trade name."
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(h) the length of time during which the
actor has used the designation;
u

(i) the intent of the actor in adopting and
using the designation."
u

Every one of the nine above tests can be applied to the
appellant's complaint to show his right to have the infringement of his trade name restrained, but since we
have heretofore shown in this brief wherein each test applies favorably to appellant, we shall not be· tedious by
repeating our stand again.

ERROR NUMBER TWO·
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS. IN ERROR
WHEN IT RENDERED AND ENTERED ITS ORDER, JUDGMENT AND DECREE HEREIN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT.
Naturally, as we have stated heretofore, we are convinced that the District Court was in error when it sustained the demurrer of the respondents. Consequently, if
the complaint states facts sufficient to state a good cause
of action, the court was in error in dismissing the complaint without the consent of appellant until the matter
had been tried. The above statements are too obvious to
press further.
The District Court also was in error in dismissing the
complaint as to the two parties-defendant not before the
Court. The District Court had no jurisdiction over defendants, The Mennen Company and John Doe; consequently the District Court had no authority to dismiss
the complaint as against all defendants. The appellant
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should still within the time prescribed by statute be permitted to serve said two defendants, or either of them,
with a copy of a summons to which a true copy of said
complaint on file herein has been attached and proceed
against said two defendants, or either of them. However,
the District Court dismissed the complaint as against all
defendants by not naming the respondents (R. 9) so appellant has been denied his legal right to proceed against
the said two defendants, The Mennen Company and John
Doe, upon finding them in the State of Utah, without appellant assuming the additional work and expense of commencing a new action and :filing a new complaint. The
District Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint
as the same effected the said two defendants until each of
the said two defendants made an appearance before the
Court and requested such action of the District Court by
some proper motion or demurrer or pleading.
CONCLUSION

We, therefore, respectfully conclude that the judg7'
ment (R. 9) and order of the District Court should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted~

RAYMOND R. BRADY

JOHN HAYS O'DONNELL
Attorneys for appellant.
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